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Abstract 
Historically, attempts to solve the liquidity puzzle have focused on narrowly 
defined monetary aggregates, such as non-borrowed reserves, the monetary 
base, or M1. Many of these efforts have failed to find a short-term negative 
correlation between interest rates and monetary policy innovations. More recent 
research uses sophisticated macroeconomic and econometric modeling. 
However, little research has investigated the role measurement error plays in the 
liquidity puzzle, since in nearly every case, work investigating the liquidity 
puzzle has used one of the official monetary aggregates, which have been shown 
to exhibit significant measurement error. This paper examines the role that 
measurement error plays in the liquidity puzzle by (i) providing a theoretical 
framework explaining how the official simple-sum methodology can lead to a 
liquidity puzzle, and (ii) testing for the liquidity effect by estimating an 
unrestricted VAR. 
Key words: Liquidity Puzzle, Monetary Policy, Monetary Aggregation, Money 
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1 Introduction 
The liquidity puzzle is defined to be the failure of monetary policy 
disturbances to create negative short-run correlations between nominal interest 
rates and the money stock.  That puzzle has been a persistent thorn in empirical 
monetary economics research. The absence of a liquidity effect appears in 
Melvin (1983), Christiano (1991), and Leeper and Gordon (1992), among many 
others. 
Historically, attempts to solve the liquidity puzzle have focused on narrowly 
defined monetary aggregates, such as non-borrowed reserves, the monetary 
base, or M1 (see, e.g., Strongin 1995 and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evens 
1996). Many of these efforts have failed to find a short-term negative correlation 
between interest rates and monetary policy innovations. Table 1 surveys data 
used and methodology found in previous studies. More recent research uses 
sophisticated macroeconomic and econometric modeling. Keen (2004), for 
example, develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with sticky 
prices and financial market frictions, and Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2005) 
utilize a factor augmented VAR which, rather than using a monetary aggregate, 
estimates unobserved factors. But little research has investigated the role 
measurement error plays in the liquidity puzzle, since in nearly every case, work 
investigating the liquidity puzzle has used one of the official monetary 
쁈ξ
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aggregates, which have been shown by Barnett (1980) and others to exhibit 
significant measurement error. 
Table 1: Summary of data and methodology used in empirical studies of the 
liquidity puzzle 
 
Author (Year)                        
Monetary 
Aggregatea 
Interestb 
Rate 
Otherc  
Variables 
Modeld 
Type 
Mishkin (1982)                  M1, M2 TB3 
IP, CPI, U, 
BOP Single 
Reichenstein (1987)             M1 TB3 IP, CPI, U Single 
Cochrane (1989)                 NBR TB3 Filter 
Leeper and Gordon (1992)                  M0, M1, M2 FF IP, CPI Single 
Sims (1992)                     M1 FF VAR 
Eichenbaum and Evens (1995)        M0, M1, NBR FF IP, CPI VAR 
Strongin (1995)                 TR, NBR FF IP, CPI VAR 
Christiano et al. (1996)               NBR FF VAR 
Serletis and Chwee (1997)                
M0, M1, M2, M3, 
L, MSI FF IP, CPI, CP VAR 
Hamilton (1997)          NBR FF Single 
Bernanke et al. (2005) None FF IP, CPI, UF F-VAR 
a
 M0 is the monetary base. M1, M2, M3, and L are official simple sum monetary 
aggregates.  NBR is non-borrowed reserves, and TR is total reserves.  MSI refers to 
Divisia money. 
b
 FF is the effective federal funds rate. TB3 is the 90 day Treasury bill rate. 
c
 IP is industrial production.  CPI is the consumer price index.  U is the unemployment 
rate. BOP is the balance of payments.  
 
The measurement problems with the official narrow money aggregates stem 
from two sources: first, narrow monetary aggregates ignore the monetary 
services of monetary assets not included; second, significant measurement error 
from the use of inferior simple sum methodology exists, even with narrow 
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monetary aggregates.
1
 In this paper, we examine the role that measurement error 
plays in the liquidity puzzle by using monetary aggregates, including a new 
measure of money, which do not suffer from the aforementioned defects.  We 
provide a theoretical framework, based on Kelly (2009), explaining how the 
simple sum methodology can lead to a liquidity puzzle and test for the liquidity 
effect by estimating an unrestricted VAR.  
We chose sub-sample periods and econometric methods to replicate 
previous studies. In particular, we follow Strongin (1995) who provides 
excellent historical justification for choice of sub-sample periods. Our results 
show that in the United States, when the current economic stock of money, as 
defined by Kelly (2010), is used as the monetary variable, liquidity effect is 
observed in all sub-periods and is significant at the 95 percent confidence level 
in the full sample and the 1982 – 2006 and 1994 – 2006 sub-periods.  Moreover, 
analysis of the variance decomposition of VAR’s estimated with various 
monetary aggregates suggest that broader monetary aggregates have more 
explanatory power over the effective federal funds rate, and that broader 
aggregates, when measured using reputable index numbers, do a better job of 
eliminating the liquidity puzzle than do narrow aggregates. This result is 
                                                           
1
 There is a long literature, beginning with Hutt (1963), establishing the 
inferiority of simple sum monetary aggregation. For a summary of this 
literature, see section 2.3. 
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surprising given that the conventional wisdom for solving the liquidity puzzle 
has been to use narrow monetary aggregates. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives a brief 
discussion of the measurement problems with the existing narrow money 
aggregates. Section 3 discusses the data that we will be using and explains the 
justification for the sample and sub-sample periods. Section 4 tests for the 
liquidity effect exhibited by various monetary variables by estimating an 
unrestricted VAR including price and output. Section 5 concludes. 
2 Problems with the Current Measures of Narrow Money 
A traditional approach to solving the liquidity puzzle has been to focus on 
narrow monetary aggregates, such as non-borrowed reserves, the monetary base, 
or M1. There exist significant measurement errors even in these narrow 
monetary aggregates. These include accounting errors in the reporting of non-
borrowed reserves, distortion caused by retail sweeps, and aggregation error 
resulting from the use of inferior simple sum methodology.  
2.1 Non-Borrowed Reserves 
Using non-borrowed reserves as the monetary quantity aggregate has been a 
common approach to focusing on narrowly defined money. See, for example, 
Serletis and Chwee (1997), who considers a non-borrowed-monetary-base VAR 
6 
to resolve the liquidity puzzle (See also Strongin (1995) and Christiano et al. 
(1996)).  
This approach is not without disadvantages, however. Recent events in 
monetary history, from 2006 through 2009, have raised serious questions about 
the quality of non-borrowed reserve data in the U.S. case. Figure 1 displays non-
borrowed reserves from January 2005 to February 2010, as published by the 
Federal Reserve Board of Governors. Note that from January 2008 through 
November 2008, non-borrowed reserves are negative, indicating that borrowed 
reserves exceeded total reserves. In other words, if Figure 1 is correct, 
equilibrium quantity of reserves borrowed exceeded the total equilibrium 
quantity of reserves supplied, which is a contradiction. Barnett and Chauvet 
(2009) explain that this inconsistency results from the improper inclusion of 
Term Auction Facility borrowing from the Federal Reserve in borrowed 
reserves, regardless of whether or not held as reserves. 
7 
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Figure 1: Non-Borrowed Reserves of Depository Institutions 
2.2 Retail Sweeps 
Retail sweeps are an accounting trick that allows depository institutions to 
reduce required reserves by temporarily transferring funds out of their 
customers’ checkable deposit accounts into money market deposit accounts 
(MMDAs), which have no statutory reserve requirement, while continuing to 
service the accounts as demand deposit accounts.  See, e.g., Anderson and 
Rasche (2000). Dutkowsky and Cynamon (2003) demonstrate how this practice 
has substantially distorted the growth of traditional measures of narrow money, 
including M1, total reserves, and the monetary base.
2
  
                                                           
2
 See also Alan Greenspan's Testimony, "Monetary Policy Report to the 
Congress," Federal Reserve Bulletin, August 1995, pp. 772-3 
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As Anderson and Rasche (2000) point out, retail sweeps are invisible to the 
customer.  Thus it is unlikely, barring competitive pressure, that depository 
institutions will pass on interest earned on these funds to the consumer. 
Moreover, from the consumers' perspective, checkable deposit account services 
remain unchanged. Hence, the official M1 aggregate is understated. 
The effect on M2 is somewhat less, because MMDA's are included in M2; 
thus the official M2 aggregate published by the Federal Reserve Board of 
Governors is unaffected by sweeps. However, aggregation theoretic monetary 
aggregates, such as the Divisia quantity aggregates are affected, since they 
correctly recognize that the services provided by demand deposits are not 
identical to those produce by properly serviced MMDA’s.  
2.3 Problems with Simple Sum Monetary Aggregates 
Barnett and others have long argued that the use of simple sum monetary 
aggregates is theoretically indefensible in a modern economy.
3
 Barnett (1980) 
proved that simple sum monetary aggregation can only be justified in theory 
when all monetary assets, including currency, yield the same own rate of 
interest; and in that paper he began the modern theory of economic monetary 
aggregation with the derivation of the user cost of money and the Divisia and 
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 See, e.g., Barnett (1980), Barnett and Serletis (2000), Barnett et al. (2005), 
Barnett et al. (2008), Barnett and Chauvet (2009), Kelly (2009), and Kelly 
(2010). 
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Fisher Ideal monetary aggregates.  Barnett, Chae, and Keating (2005) 
demonstrated that simple sum aggregates often exhibit significant upward bias. 
Kelly (2009) demonstrated that simple sum monetary aggregates fail to capture 
much of the dynamics between interest rates and the money stock. We will 
review the argument presented by Kelly (2009) in this sub-section. 
2.3.1 Definition of the Current Stock of Money  
Following Barnett (1991), we define the economic stock of money (ESM) 
as the present value of current and future monetary service flows. Barnett, 
Keating and Kelly (2008) and Barnett et al. (2005) formulate ESM under 
uncertainty as  
 
1
N
t t s ns ns
s t n
ESM E m ψ
∞
= =
  
= Γ  
  
∑ ∑ , (1) 
where 
 /
s t
s
s t
u u
C C
β −
∂ ∂
Γ =
∂ ∂
 (2) 
is the subjectively-discounted marginal rate of intertemporal substitution 
between tC , consumption in the current period t , and sC , consumption in the 
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future period s .4 There are N  monetary assets, ntm is the quantity of monetary 
asset n  held in period t  and ntψ  is the user cost price of monetary asset n  
held in period t .5 
Kelly (2010) showed that the ESM can be decomposed into two stocks by 
defining 
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,
1
0 if 0
if 0
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Then noting that 
 ns nt nsm m m s t= + ∀ ≥% , (4) 
and substituting (4) into (1), he got 
 
1 1
N N
t t s nt ns t s ns ns
s t n s t n
ESM E m E mψ ψ
∞ ∞
= = = =
   
= Γ + Γ   
   
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ % . (5) 
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 The representative consumer's current period intertemporal utility 
function, tu , is a standard utility function containing monetary assets. It is 
assumed to be blockwise weakly separable in each period's consumption of 
goods and monetary assets. Note that it is not an elementary utility function in 
good alone, since it contains monetary assets. It is the derived utility function 
that exists if money has positive value in equilibrium. See Arrow and Hahn 
(1971) for proof of the existence of the derived utility function. 
5
 The user cost, ntψ , used here is the user cost under risk neutrality derived 
by Barnett (1995) and Barnett et al. (1997). It is formulated as 
1
t t t nt
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t t
E R E r
E R
ψ
−
=
+
. 
See Barnett and Serletis (2000) for further relevant reference on monetary 
aggregation under risk. 
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Kelly (2010) named the first double summation the current stock of money 
(CSM), which can be interpreted to be the stock of currency needed to provide 
the monetary service flow equivalent to that of the contemporaneous monetary 
portfolio, excluding expected future changes in the portfolio allocation. 
Consider the following assumptions: 
1. The expectation of the stochastic discount factor in time period t 
is ( ) ( )
1
1 ,
s
t s t u
u t
E E R
−
=
Γ = +  ∏  
2. the benchmark rate follows a martingale process, so that 
( )t s tE R R= for all s t≥ , 
3. ( )1 , 0N nt nsncov m ψ= Γ =∑ , 
4. and nsψ  follows a martingale process 1n N∀ = … . 
 
Kelly (2010) showed under those assumptions that the current stock of money, 
CSM, reduces to the currency equivalent index (Rotemberg, Driscoll, and 
Poterba (1995)), 
 
1
N
t nt
t nt
n t
R r
CSM m
R=
−
=∑ , (6) 
where tR  is the rate of return on the benchmark asset in period t  and ntr  is the 
rate of return yielded by monetary asset n  in period t . Barnett (1991) 
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previously showed that the CE index is a special case of the discounted present 
value of the Divisia monetary service flow. 
2.3.2 Definition of the Investment Stock of Money 
We define the investment stock of money (ISM) in time period t  to be the 
discounted present value of the return yielded by the portfolio of monetary 
assets held during time period t . Kelly (2009) derives the ISM, through a direct 
application of asset pricing theory, to be 
 
1
N
t t s nt ns
s t n
ISM E m r
∞
= =
  
= Γ  
  
∑ ∑ , (7) 
where sΓ  is the subjectively-discounted marginal rate of intertemporal 
substitution between consumption in the current period t  and the future period 
s , ntm  is the quantity of monetary asset n  held in period t , and ntr  is the 
return yielded by monetary asset n  held in period t . 
Now consider the following assumptions: 
1. The expectation of the stochastic discount factor in time period t 
is ( ) ( )
1
1
s
t s t u
u t
E E R
−
=
Γ = +  ∏ , 
2. the benchmark rate follows a martingale process, so that ( )t s tE R R=  
for all s t≥ , 
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3. ( )1 , 0N nt nsncov m r= Γ =∑ , 
4. and nsr  follows a martingale process 1n N∀ = … . 
Kelly (2009) showed under those assumptions that (7) reduces to 
 
1
N
nt
t nt
n t
r
ISM m
R=
=∑ . (8) 
2.3.3 Decomposition of the Simple Sum Monetary Aggregates 
Combining (6) and (8) yields 
 
1 1 1
N N N
t nt nt
t t nt nt nt
n n nt t
R r r
CSM ISM m m m
R R= = =
−
+ = + =∑ ∑ ∑ , (9) 
where 
1
N
nt
n
m
=
∑  is the simple sum monetary aggregate (SSUM). Hence, the 
SSUM confounds together CSM and ISM.
6
 Kelly (2009) studies this 
confounding by examining the first derivative of each with respect to the return 
yielded by each monetary asset:  
 1nt
nt t
m
CSM n N
r R
∂
= − ∀ = …
∂
, (10) 
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 See Barnett et al. (2005), Barnett et al. (2008), and Kelly (2009) for further 
discussion of how simple sum monetary aggregates confound the monetary and 
investment functions of monetary assets. 
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 1nt
nt t
m
ISM n N
r R
∂
= ∀ = …
∂
. (11) 
Note that (10) and (11) are identical, except that they have opposite signs. 
Moreover, Kelly (2009) showed that the first difference of CSM and the first 
difference of ISM are strongly negatively correlated. Since ntr  is a function of 
interest rates,  equations (9), (10) and (11) make it clear that the simple sum 
monetary aggregates fail to capture the true relationship between the economic 
money stock and interest rates. Thus, theory predicts that when simple sum 
aggregation is used, a liquidity puzzle is a likely outcome. 
3 Preliminaries Concerning Data 
3.1 Data Selection 
We chose variables to replicate the analysis of Leeper and Gordon (1992), 
with the exception of the monetary aggregates chosen and the use of core PCE. 
Variables and transformations used are as follows: 
FEDF is the first difference of the effective Federal Funds Rate; 
CSM is the log change of the Current Stock of Money seasonally adjusted 
measured by the Currency Equivalent Index (See Rotemberg et al., 
1995 and Kelly 2010); 
NBR is the log change of non-borrowed  reserves; 
15 
PCE is the log change of the personal consumption expenditures price 
deflator , excluding seasonally adjusted food and energy, as excluded 
by the Federal Reserve to focus on long run inflation ; 
IP is the log change of the industrial production index seasonally adjusted. 
3.2 Sample and Sub-sample Period Selection 
We analyze monthly data from January 1979 through June 2006, which we 
divide into three sub-periods based on the operating regime history of the 
Federal Reserve.  Strongin (1995) gives excellent support for this subdivision, 
which we repeat here: 
1979 – 1982: Non-borrowed reserves targeting. This sub-period corresponds 
roughly to the episode in monetary history known as the monetarist 
experiment. Short-run money growth targets were set at each FOMC 
meeting, and then non-borrowed reserves targets were calculated based 
on those money growth targets.  
1982 – 2006: Borrowed reserves/Federal funds targeting. During this sub-
period, the Federal Reserve abandoned setting short-run money growth 
targets in favor of using the Federal Funds rate as an operational 
intermediate target.  
1994 – 2006: The Federal Reserve Board permitted the use of Retail Sweeps.  In 
1994, the Federal Reserve allowed the use of retail sweeps, which were 
shown by Dutkowsky and Cynamon (2003) to distort the growth of 
16 
traditional measures of narrow money. This distortion has led to a 
significant literature on the effects of sweeps. 
These sub-periods are roughly equivalent to sub-periods used by Leeper and 
Gordon (1992).  The 1994 – 2006 sub-period is not used in either Strongin 
(1995) or Leeper and Gordon (1992); however, given the impact of retail sweeps 
on narrow money, 1994 - 2006 is a natural sub-period to investigate. 
4 Evidence from the VAR  
4.1 Identification 
We begin our empirical analysis by following Leeper and Gordon (1992) in 
estimating a VAR including money growth, FEDF, PCE and IP.  Let  
 ( ), , ,t t t t tZ FEDF PCE IPρ
′
=  (12) 
be the vector of variables for which we estimate  
 ( ) ( )1 , ~ 0, ,t t t tZ A B L Z u u N−= + + Σ  (13) 
where tρ  is a measure of the log change of the money stock. The system is 
fully unrestricted, so lags of all four variables are allowed to predict money 
growth. Leeper and Gordon point out that this system has a long history in the 
literature, having been studied extensively by Sims (1980) and Litterman and 
Weiss (1985), among others, before Leeper and Gordon (1992). 
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We estimate a separate VAR for NBR and CSM at the M1, M2 and M3 
levels of aggregation for the full sample and each sub-sample. The Akaike 
information criterion is used to select lag length for each VAR estimated. Table 
2 reports lag length selected for each VAR. 
Table 2: Lag length selection.  
1979-2006   Log Likelihood AIC Lag Length 
NBR 3553.75 -20.50 13 
CSM (M1) 3995.40 -22.82 17 
CSM (M2) 3631.02 -20.58 17 
CSM (M3) 3585.73 -20.31 17 
1979-1982   Log Likelihood AIC Lag Length 
NBR 477.56 -18.40 2 
CSM (M1) 588.09 -19.00 8 
CSM (M2) 412.63 -16.36 1 
CSM (M3) 401.58 -15.90 1 
1982-2006   Log Likelihood AIC Lag Length 
NBR 3342.01 -22.14 8 
CSM (M1) 3857.63 -24.81 16 
CSM (M2) 3402.66 -22.45 9 
CSM (M3) 3496.8 -22.21 17 
1994-2006   Log Likelihood AIC Lag Length 
NBR 1791.88 -24.05 2 
CSM (M1) 1982.47 -26.88 1 
CSM (M2) 1848.38 -25.05 1 
CSM (M3) 1810.42 -24.53 1 
4.2 Alternative Monetary Aggregates and the Liquidity Puzzle   
We estimate  tZ  for each of four measures of the money stock. We use 
non-borrowed reserves as our benchmark model, because attempts to solve the 
liquidity puzzle have focused on narrowly defined monetary aggregates in 
general and non-borrowed reserves in particular (see Serletis and Chwee 1997).  
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We calculate generalized impulse response functions as described by 
Pesaran and Shin (1998), who construct an orthogonal set of innovations that do 
not depend on the VAR ordering used.
7
 Figure 2 plots the accumulated response 
of the FEDF to a positive one-standard-deviation shock of the log change of 
various measures of the money stock. The confidence band is computed using 
asymptotic standard errors. 
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Figure 2: Accumulated impulse response of the FEDF to a positive one standard 
deviation shock of the log difference of various measures of the money stock, 
where NBR is non-borrowed  reserves and CSM (M1), CSM (M2), CSM (M3) 
are the Current Stock of Money measured at the M1, M2 and M3 levels of 
aggregation. An orthogonal set of innovations that do not depend on the VAR 
ordering are used (Pesaran and Shin 1998). The confidence band is computed 
using asymptotic standard errors. 
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 We also tried several recursive orderings using a Cholesky decomposition. 
This did not significantly change our results. 
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When non-borrowed reserves are used to measure the money stock, we find 
a negative correlation between an innovation in the money stock and the 
response of the FEDF. While the liquidity effect is statistically significant for 
about six months after the initial shock, the magnitude of the response is still 
quite small, only about 0.25%.  Results from the sub-periods are similar.  
The CSM does not fare as well at the M1 or M2 levels of aggregation as at 
the M3 level.  During the 1979 – 1982 sub-period, the response of CSM M1 and 
M2 to the FEDF is always positive, although never significant. During the 1982 
– 2006 sub-period, CSM at the M2 level exhibits the liquidity effect, but it is 
statistically insignificant. During the 1994 – 2006 sub-period, however, we see 
strong, statistically significant liquidity effect exhibited at both M1 and M2 
levels of aggregation. CSM at the M3 level of the aggregation exhibits liquidity 
effect during the full sample and in all sub-periods, although that effect is not 
significant during the 1979 – 1982 sub-period. With the exception of the 1979 – 
1982 sub-period, the CSM (M3) exhibits stronger and more persistent liquidity 
effect than does non-borrowed.  
It might initially seem surprising that the broader aggregates exhibit 
stronger liquidity effect than the narrow aggregates, as the conventional wisdom 
has been to use narrow aggregates to fix the liquidity puzzle. However, given 
both the analysis in section 2.3.3 and aggregation theory, it is not unexpected 
that the properly weighted broader aggregates perform better. Traditional narrow 
money measures, such as non-borrowed reserves, arbitrarily discard 
20 
information, ignoring the monetary services of monetary assets not included, 
while improperly weighted broad monetary aggregates severely distort the 
monetary service flow by failing to remove the investment motive which is 
greatest for the most distant substitutes for currency. 
4.3 Analysis of the Variance Decomposition of FEDF 
If traditional measures of narrow money are discarding relevant information 
about the monetary effect of assets not included in the aggregate, then we should 
see evidence in the variance decomposition of the FEDF. Given the analysis in 
section 4.2, we would expect broader aggregates to explain a greater percentage 
of the variance of the FEDF. Figure 3 plots the percentage of variance of the 
first difference of the FEDF by various monetary variables. 
21 
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Figure 3: Percentage of variance of the first difference of the FEDF with various 
monetary variables. A separate VAR is estimated for each monetary aggregate 
and each sub-period. The variance decompositions were computed using the 
following Cholesky ordering: log difference of the money stock, FEDF, PCE, 
and IP. 
For each VAR estimated, the variance decompositions of the log change of 
the FEDF were computed using the following Cholesky ordering:  log difference 
of the money stock, FEDF, PCE, and IP. We tried various Cholesky orderings 
without significant variations in results. Our chosen ordering was selected to be 
consistent with Leeper and Gordon (1992). 
During the full sample period, the CSM explains a greater proportion of the 
variance in the FEDF than does non-borrowed reserves at all levels of 
aggregation, and the CSM explains a greater proportion of the variance in the 
22 
FEDF in all sub-periods except 1979 – 1982.  In sub-periods after 1982, we saw 
that CSM (M3) explains the greatest proportion of the variance in the FEDF, as 
is consistent with the results from analysis of the impulse response functions.  
4.4 Further Discussion of Results 
Leeper and Gordon (1992) provide a summary of their result, which we find 
convenient to quote in order to place our results into context with theirs. 
“The response of interest rates to a money growth innovation 
frequently becomes positive and is never negative when the 
correlations are conditioned on past interest rates money 
growth, prices and output.” (Leeper and Gordon, 1992) 
We found that when CSM (M3) is used to measure the money stock, the 
response of the Federal Funds Rate is negative in our full sample and in all sub-
periods tested, and the negative response is significant in all but the 1979 – 1982 
sub-period. 
“The signs and the patterns of the correlations between money 
growth and interest rates are not robust across sub-periods.” 
(Leeper and Gordon, 1992) 
With the exception of NBR, we find similar inconsistency in the signs of the 
response of the federal funds rate across sub periods at lower levels of 
aggregation (M1 and M2). However that inconsistency vanishes when a 
properly measured and sufficiently broad aggregate is used. 
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“When prices and output are also included in the unrestricted 
VAR, the correlation [between money stock innovations and 
the Federal Funds Rate] is positive, independent of the 
assumption about the exogeneity of money.” (Leeper and 
Gordon, 1992) 
In an unrestricted VAR including price and output, we found the response of the 
Federal Funds Rate to innovations of money stock was negative across sub-
periods for NBR and CSM (M3), but that response is stronger and remains 
significant for a longer period when CSM (M3) is used. 
5 Conclusion 
The traditional approach to solving the liquidity puzzle has been to use a 
narrowly defined monetary aggregate, such as non-borrowed reserves. Our 
results suggest that this may not be the best approach for two reasons.  (1) We 
see from aggregation theory that the simple sum methodologies employed in the 
official monetary aggregates, published by the Federal Reserve and many other 
central banks, confound the monetary and investment stocks of money, thereby 
confounding substitution and income effects of interest rate changes. This 
confounding masks the relationship between the money stock and interest rates. 
(2) Traditional narrow money measures, such as non-borrowed reserves, 
arbitrarily discard information, ignoring the monetary effects of monetary assets 
not included in the aggregate. 
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We found that when measured using a reputable index number, broader 
monetary aggregates exhibit stronger liquidity effect than do narrow measures. 
This is contrary to the current literature. We also found from the variance 
decompositions analysis that the properly-weighted broader aggregates typically 
contain more explanatory information than the narrow aggregates about the 
movements of the FEDF. 
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